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Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that workers not only care for absolute but also for relative payo¤ and often have a preference for equitable payo¤ distributions. 1 Not only dislike workers income inequity among peers but also in regard to …rm pro…t when it comes to the distribution of productive surplus between labor and …rm owners. In wage bargaining situations, workers often call for fairness, thereby demanding a wage level that awards them a reasonable part of the productive rent.
The existent literature has extensively examined the impact of social preferences on optimal labor contracts in standard principal-agent models in which the whole bargaining power is assigned to the principal. In such a situation, the principal makes the worker a take-it-or-leaveit o¤er that is accepted by the worker if it makes him just as well o¤ as in his second-best opportunity. This approach is generally useful when we are mainly interested in the e¢ ciency properties of the resulting optimal contract. Yet, the results are not always suitable when we are concerned with distributionary characteristics of optimal labor contracts. In particular, real-world wage setting is often more appropriately re ‡ected by assuming that the …rm and the worker bargain over the wage contract. Typically, …rm owners as well as workers possess some power in such bargaining scenarios. For example, unions and employers'associations frequently engage in extensive bargaining procedures in the process of which workers demand higher or 'fairer'wages.
In the current paper, we present a model that introduces social preferences in an environment in which a …rm bargains over the optimal labor contract with its worker in the absence of moral hazard. We assume that the worker exhibits inequity aversion in the sense of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) towards the …rm. 2 More precisely, the worker compares his own net income under the contract with …rm pro…t and dislikes inequitable surplus distributions in any productive state. Formally, we employ the Generalized Nash-bargaining framework (Nash (1950) ) so that the …rm and the worker may possess di¤erent levels of bargaining power. The present analysis highlights an interesting novelty regarding the impact of inequity aversion on the optimal labor contract. In particular, the optimal wage contract endogenously determines the level of surplus to be shared in the process of bargaining over the optimal contract. Our analysis proceeds in three steps. As a benchmark, we …rst determine the …rst-best welfare-maximizing contract. Second, we derive the pro…t-maximizing contract which the …rm o¤ers the worker if it has all the bargaining power. Then we solve the Generalized Nash-bargaining problem for the optimal wage contract and compare the results to the foregoing contracts. Moreover, we investigate the impact of bargaining power and the strength of the worker's inequity aversion on the parties' respective income and the e¢ ciency of the contract. 1 See, e.g., Goranson and Berkowitz (1966) , Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) , Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1998) , Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , or Charness and Rabin (2002) . For an overview of the extensive literature on the e¤ects of relative pay comparisons see Akerlof and Yellen (1990) . An overview of the experimental literature on other-regarding preferences is provided by, e.g., Camerer (2003) or Fehr and Schmidt (2006) . 2 Regarding the formalization of the worker's utility function, we follow Englmaier and Wambach (2010) so that the worker's disutility due to inequity aversion is convex in income inequity. Moreover, in line with Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , we assume that the worker's feelings of envy exceed his feelings of empathy.
We …nd that the welfare-maximizing contract stipulates an equal sharing rule in each productive state. Notably, this result contradicts the Pareto-e¢ cient contract with purely self-regarding workers where a …xed wage su¢ ces to implement the …rst-best solution. Intuitively, a contract that awards the worker half of the surplus in each state avoids income inequity altogether and thus avoids any welfare loss due to inequity aversion. By contrast, the pro…t-maximizing contract if the worker possesses no bargaining power, never implements the …rst-best solution. In particular, the …rm sets the wage so that it earns more than the worker in any state. Interestingly, this implies that agency costs arise due to the worker's inequity aversion even though e¤ort is contractible. Moreover, the optimal contract depends on the realized output level although moral hazard is absent and incentives are not needed.
The optimal contract with bargaining is also state-dependent, involves pro…t sharing, and entails a welfare loss due to inequity aversion whenever bargaining power is not equally distributed among the parties. Depending on the parties'relative bargaining power, the …rm may earn more or less than the worker. Compared to the case with purely sel…sh workers, the optimal contract, however, implements a more egalitarian distribution of surplus. The reason is that such a contract lowers the welfare loss due to inequity aversion. Interestingly, the worker's optimal wage may be increasing or decreasing in the worker's concern for inequity. Intuitively, depending on the relative bargaining power of labor, and, hence, relative earnings, increasing the …xed wage may entail more or less income inequity. The optimal …xed wage reduces the possible welfare loss due to both advantageous and disadvantageous income inequity from the worker's perspective. Notably, the optimal contract approaches the welfare-optimal contract as the parties'bargaining weights converge.
Our results help explain why workers are willing to accept lower wages in times of crisis but demand higher wages in times of economic rise. Moreover, we can conclude that an increase in the worker's concern for equity leads to a more equitable income distribution in the bargaining process and thus, a more even overall distribution of the productive surplus from the employment relationship. Our …ndings also imply that raising the bargaining power of the less powerful party may increase overall welfare. It may thus be socially e¢ cient to design institutions on the labor market in a way to achieve a well-balanced distribution of bargaining power among …rm owners and productive workers.
The present paper brings together the literature on wage bargaining and that on social preferences. Optimal labor contracts in Nash-bargaining settings have been extensively discussed (see, e.g., Pissarides (2000) , ). Typically, the optimal sharing rule awards each party its outside option and divides the additional surplus of the relationship proportional to the players' bargaining power. Yet we are aware of only one paper that analyzes the consequences of social preferences in such an environment: Dur and Tichem (2012) study the e¤ects of altruism and spite on relational incentives in a repeated bargaining-setting. 3 In contrast to our work, they emphasize the relevance of social relations between the principal and the agent and focus on the provision of implicit incentives in a moral-hazard setting. Moreover, both parties have social preferences in their model and are concerned with relative utilities levels rather than relative net income. We contribute to that literature by focusing on the impact of workers'preferences for equitable surplus distributions in regard to the …rm on the optimal labor contract with bargaining. 4 Following a multiplicity of …eld and laboratory evidence on the relevance of social preferences, during recent years, there is a steadily evolving literature that investigates the e¤ects of otherregarding preferences in theoretical models of optimal decision-making and labor contracts. Alternative approaches regarding the formalization of social preferences have been presented (Rabin (1993) , Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , Falk and Fischbacher (2006) ). The majority of subsequent studies is either concerned with inequity aversion as proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , that is, workers feel envy and empathy, or focus on envy alone. As already noted above, almost all these studies focus on optimal incentive contracting in principal-agent models in which the principal possesses all bargaining power. Moreover, the majority of papers focus on fairness concerns among workers, i.e., horizontal social preferences. 5 More closely related to our work are the papers by Dur and Glazer (2008) and Englmaier and Wambach (2010) which examine optimal labor contracts when workers care about inequality relative to the principal. While Englmaier and Wambach (2010) analyze inequity aversion, Dur and Glazer (2008) focus on envy towards the …rm and, in line with our work, consider an environment with contractible e¤ort. By contrast, Englmaier and Wambach (2010) also analyze optimal contracts under moral hazard. Both papers moreover consider the impact of risk aversion but assume that the principal has the whole bargaining power. In line with our results, both studies …nd that the …rm bene…ts from pro…t sharing due to the worker's social preference. We contribute to that literature by extending the discussion to optimal contracts under bargaining. In particular, we highlight that the …rst-best solution is never implemented under the pro…t-maximizing contract while it may be achieved with bargaining by converging the bargaining power of the worker and the …rm. We moreover show that inequity aversion not only reduces social welfare but also a¤ects the optimal distribution of surplus with bargaining. In particular, a higher concern for equity increases (lowers) the worker's share when he has less (more) bargaining power than the …rm.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the model. In Sections 3 and 4, we derive the welfare-maximizing contract and the pro…t-maximizing if the worker has no bargaining power, respectively. In Section 5, we derive our main results concerning the optimal labor contract with bargaining and analyze the impact of the worker's bargaining weight and inequity aversion on the results. Finally, Section 6 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
The Model
We model the interaction between a pro…t-maximizing …rm (principal) and a utility-maximizing worker (agent). The worker exerts e¤ort e in order to produce veri…able output Q and incurs e¤ort costs c(e); where c (0) = c 0 (0) = 0; c 0 (e) > 0 if e > 0, c 00 (e) 0, and lim e!1 c 0 (e) = 1. Output can take a high or low value, i.e., Q 2 fL; Hg with H > L 0: The level of output is low if the worker exerts 'normal'e¤ort, i.e., e = 0, and high output is realized with probability
The worker is risk neutral but inequity averse towards the …rm in the sense of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . Formally, we employ the utility function proposed by Englmaier and Wambach (2010) but depart by assuming that the agent is concerned with relative net income, i.e., in any state the worker compares his wage net of e¤ort costs to …rm pro…t. 6 Accordingly, the agent's utility of wage W is given by:
Denoting by D the di¤erence in …rm pro…t (Q W ) and the worker's net payo¤ (W c (e)), the function G (D) captures the worker's preference for equitable income distributions in any state. Figure 1 illustrates the basic properties of the function as stated above. Accordingly, the worker's disutility from income inequity is represented by a strictly convex function which is positive whenever D 6 = 0 and not symmetric around the equitable allocation (D = 0). In the reminder, we speak of income inequity whenever D 6 = 0: The asymmetry of the function G(D) implies that the worker su¤ers more from disadvantageous inequity (D > 0) than he dislikes advantageous inequity (D < 0) for some given absolute di¤erence in net payo¤s. Intuitively, in line with Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , the worker's propensity for envy exceeds his feelings of compassion. Moreover, the worker's disutility increases overproportionally as income di¤erences rise in either direction. Finally, the parameter > 0 denotes the individual weight the worker puts on achieving equitable outcomes. We focus on the case where the worker's e¤ort is contractible, i.e., there is no moral hazard and thus no need for incentives. Yet, in contrast to the case with a purely self-regarding worker, the distribution of surplus across states plays a role not only for the worker's willingness to accept a contract but also for the size of the overall surplus. Accordingly, the wage W (e; Q) is The worker is paid a …xed wage w in any state and obtains an additional amount of if output is high. The size of the latter payment hence determines the distribution of surplus across states.
In the remainder, we will refer to as the wage spread. Under such a contract, the parties' respective expected payo¤s become:
where W denotes the worker's expected net payo¤ and F the expected …rm pro…t. The worker's expected utility depends on W and the expected level of income inequity D = Q 2W + c (e) in the two states. Denote the (ex-post) di¤erence in net payo¤s in state
. The worker's expected utility is thus given by:
The timing is as follows. First, the worker and the …rm bargain over the labor contract fe; w; g. Formally, we apply the Generalized Nash-bargaining framework and denote withbenchmark, we also analyze the case where the worker has no bargaining power ( = 0) so that the …rm makes a take-it-ot-leave-it o¤er to the worker.
Welfare-maximizing Contract
In this section, we determine the welfare-maximizing (Pareto-e¢ cient) contract fê;ŵ;^ g. The overall expected welfare is given by the sum of expected …rm pro…t F as given in equation (2) and the worker's expected utility EU as given in equation (4). Thus, the welfare-maximizing contract solves:
By inspection of the objective function, overall welfare S is decreasing in the worker's disutility due to inequity aversion. The following proposition states the solution to problem (I) and shows that the …rst-best wage paymentsŵ and^ are such that D H = D L = 0. That is, in the welfare-maximizing solution, parties split the ex-post surplus S Q = Q c (e) equally in any state.
Proposition 1
The welfare-maximizing contract fê;ŵ;^ g stipulates an equal sharing rule in any state. In particular, the optimal contract elements are:
The associated …rst-best expected surplus is given by:
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proposition shows that the worker's wage isŵ = S L =2 + c (ê) if output is low and w +^ = S H =2 + c (ê) if it is high. Accordingly, …rm pro…t amounts to S L =2 and S H =2, respectively. Hence, in contrast to the case with a purely self-regarding worker, the …rst-best contract is not a …xed-wage contract but awards the worker half of the surplus in each state in addition to his cost of e¤ort. This implies that not only the …rm earns more when output is high but also the worker (^ > 0). Obviously, the …rst-best contract maximizes overall welfare by avoiding the occurrence of inequity aversion altogether. As a result, the contract implements …rst-best e¤ortê for which marginal productivity equals marginal costs of e¤ort:
4 Pro…t-maximizing Contract
In this section, we analyze the benchmark case where the …rm possesses all the bargaining power, i.e., = 0. The case coincides with the principal-agent game in which the …rm makes the worker a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. We thus replicate and extend some of the …ndings from the existent literature on vertical inequity aversion without bargaining (Englmaier and Wambach (2010) , Dur and Glazer (2008) ).
When the …rm makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, its optimization problem is given by:
Condition (PC) denotes the worker's participation constraint. In the proof of the following proposition, we verify that condition (PC) is binding in the optimal contract. This implies that the …rm's expected wage costs amount to the worker's cost of e¤ort plus the so-called inequity premium. The latter is the worker's expected disutility due to income inequity across states and is represented by the absolute value of the last two terms in EU . Notably, the level of wage payments w; a¤ects the size of the inequity premium. For any e¤ort level, the …rm seeks to minimize the expected inequity premium. We show that this is achieved by setting w; such that income inequity D is equal across states. The following proposition characterizes the optimal contract.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the …rm possesses all the bargaining power. Then under the optimal contract (e ; w ; ): (i) e¤ ort is …rst-best, i.e., e =ê, (ii) income inequity is equal across states; D H = D L =: D , (iii) the optimal wage spread is =^ = (H L) =2, (iv) the …rm earns more than half of the surplus in each state; D > 0, (v) the optimal …xed wage w is uniquely de…ned by the solution to
(vi) the worker's expected wage is given by
Proof. For the proof of (i )-(iii ), see the Appendix. There we show that the participation constraint (PC) is binding, and thus, the optimal …xed wage w is implicitly de…ned by equation (10), where D is a function of w. The left-hand side of the latter equation is the identity function, thus strictly increasing in w with a slope of 1, as shown in Figure 2 . De…ne by g(w) the function on the right-hand side of equation (10). Since c(e ) e is a constant, it implies that
, i.e., for D > 0, g(w) is decreasing, while
Figure 2: Equation (10) and the optimal …xed wage w
, g(w) is increasing and moreover, since in the second case the feasible solutions are for G 0 (D) > 1=2, the slope of g 0 (w) < 1. In addition, one can easily verify that g(w) is a convex function with a minimum value g(
In Figure 2 , we have plotted two examples of the function depending on whether minimum value of g(w) is negative or positive. Comparing the values of both functions for w = L+c(e) 2
(the left and the right hand sides of equation (10)), we can see that w =
; the function at the left hand side is negative, for negative w, it is strictly increasing and for w =
is greater than g(w); while the function at the right hand side is positive for relatively small w; it is strictly decreasing and for w = L+c(e) 2 has a smaller value than the one of the identity function. Therefore, there is a solution of equation (10) , g(w) has a smaller slope than the identity function, and thus, both functions cannot intersect each other implying that the found solution is indeed a unique one. Moreover, w < L+c(e) 2 , i.e., the solution is such that the payo¤ of the …rm exceeds the one of the worker implying that D > 0; for any 0 < < 1: Note, however, that if converges towards in…nity (the slope of g(w) for w < L+c(e) 2 will be almost a vertical line), the optimal …xed wage w ! L+c(e) 2
, and thus, the optimal to the …rm contract converges towards the welfare-maximizing one. 9 Since (PC) is binding at the optimum, the expected wage equals the costs of e¤ort and the minimized inequity premium, as shown in (11). 9 To examine this result in another way, let us assume that there is still some ; su¢ ciently large, such that D = 0 is optimal for the …rm, i.e., EU =Ŝ=2 > 0: Since between any two di¤erent real numbers, one can …nd another real one, there exists a positive number betweenŜ=2 and 0; such that it equalsŜ=2 2" for some " > 0: Thus, there should be a small number ", such that "= = G(2 "); and since is su¢ ciently large, G(2 ") will be close to zero, or " will be closed to zero and thus, smaller than ": If the …rm pays instead the optimal …xed wage a wage w = w ", the pro…t of the …rm will be F =Ŝ=2 + ", thus, increased, while the expected utility of the worker will be EU =Ŝ=2 " G(2 "), or equivalently, EU =Ŝ=2 " " >Ŝ=2 2", where the later is positive by de…nition of ". Hence, the …rm pro…t is increased, while the participation constraint is still satis…ed, which contradicts to the optimality of the contract.
As under the …rst-best contract, the …rm implements the …rst-best e¤ort levelê. Moreover, the …rm sets the wage spread so that the worker obtains half of the increase in output due to work e¤ort. Notably, this result is in sharp contrast to the case of self-regarding agents in which a …xed-wage contract ( = 0) implements the …rst-best solution. With an inequity averse worker, the optimal contract is state-dependent ( > 0) and does generally not implement the …rst-best solution. To see this, observe that the …rm faces an interesting trade-o¤ regarding expected wage costs (sum of e¤ort costs and inequity premium). Increasing the worker's wage towards half of the surplus in any state (S Q =2) reduces the inequity premium and thus expected wage costs. At the same time, however, doing so directly increases wage costs and hence reduces the …rm's pro…t. The contract (e ; w ; ) optimally trades o¤ these two counteracting e¤ects on …rm pro…t. As in the case with a self-regarding worker, the …rm extracts all the surplus from the relationship on expectation. The associated …rm pro…t hence coincides with surplus and becomes:
The above equation shows that surplus, and consequently, …rm pro…t are reduced by the worker's disutility due to inequity aversion, since D > 0, i.e., there is some income inequity between …rm and worker. The reason is that the worker su¤ers from envy and must be compensated accordingly. Note that, from Proposition 2 (iv ), we know that the optimal contract, never leads to D < 0. Intuitively, this is never optimal for the …rm because it then not only earns less than the worker but also needs to pay inequity-premium costs because the worker would su¤er from empathy. By equation (10), the optimal wage w and hence the optimal level of income inequity D implicitly depend on the worker's degree of inequity aversion . Thus, in the following, we take a closer look at the impact of on the relative income of the two parties and …nally derive a conclusion regarding the overall e¢ ciency of the optimal contract.
By inspection of the foregoing proposition, the optimal level of e¤ort, e , and the wage spread, are una¤ected by the worker's concern for income equity, . By contrast, equation (10) implies that the optimal …xed wage w implicitly depends on , as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The optimal …xed wage w is increasing in the individual weight the worker puts on achieving equitable outcomes .
Proof. Applying the Implicit-Function Theorem to equation (10) yields:
As shown in the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix, feasible are solutions such that G 0 (D) > 1=2, and thus, the denominator of (13) is positive. Together with G(D) > 0 if D 6 = 0, this implies that the derivative of w with respect to is positive, which concludes the proof.
Intuitively, the more inequity averse the worker, the more he su¤ers from the fact that the …rm earns more. The …rm counteracts the increase in inequity-premium costs by reducing income inequity D. That is, it increases the worker's wage by the same amount in both states, hence raises the …xed wage. Clearly, doing so is useful only as long as the worker's net income falls bellow …rm pro…t. The reason is that, if D = 0 , a further increase of the …xed wage leads to income inequity as well -in this case advantageous inequity -and hence raises inequity-premium costs due to the worker's feelings of empathy. The consequences of an increase in on …rm pro…t, income and utility of the worker under the optimal contract are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 The expected pro…t of the …rm decreases in the worker's concern for income inequity, , while the expected payo¤ of the worker increases. The worker's expected utility is, however, una¤ ected by his concern for income inequity.
Proof. By Proposition 2, the payo¤s of both parties (2) and (3) can be rewritten as follows:
Taking the derivatives with respect to , and applying Lemma 3, yields
Finally, the …rm chooses the contract so that condition (PC) is binding for any , yielding EU = 0.
The intuition is straightforward. As the worker's concern for inequity rises, the …rm needs to pay him a larger inequity premium and hence raise his wage, thereby reducing its own pro…t. However, if the worker is extremely inequity averse, i.e., ! 1, the …rm optimally chooses w so that the worker earns almost half of the surplus in any state (G(D ) ! 0). Intuitively, when the individual weight the worker puts on achieving equitable outcomes is so large, the …rm increases the …xed wage, which yields to a decrease in the value of G(D): Yet, the forgoing …ndings imply that the net di¤erence of the …rm pro…t and the worker's net payo¤ is always positive (D > 0), and thus, the pro…t-maximizing contract leads to reduced welfare. Notably, this implies that, in contrast to the case with a self-regarding worker, agency costs then arise although e¤ort is contractible. These observations lead to the following conclusion.
Corollary 1 With an inequity averse worker and contractible e¤ ort, the pro…t-maximizing wage contract (e ; w ; ) does not implement the …rst-best solution. In particular, the optimal contract then leads to income inequity in all states (D > 0). As a result, …rm pro…t, and thus, overall welfare are reduced by the amount of the inequity premium; S =Ŝ G (D ) <Ŝ.
The foregoing results are related to the …ndings by Englmaier and Wambach (2010) and Dur and Glazer (2008) . In particular, both studies also …nd that surplus sharing is optimal with inequity aversion and envy, respectively, so that …rm pro…t is decreasing in the worker's social preference.
Optimal Contract with Nash Bargaining
In this section, we turn to the case where workers and the …rm engage in Generalized Nash bargaining. Denoting with 2 (0; 1) the bargaining power of labor, the optimal contract is then de…ned as:
e ; w ; = arg max e;w;
Notably, in contrast to models with purely sel…sh workers, in our model, the surplus to be shared in the process of bargaining, S(e; w; ) = EU + F , is (weakly) decreasing in the level of income inequity among the parties. This implies that the surplus endogenously depends on the result of bargaining, that is, the parties'negotiated shares as determined by the contract (e; w; ). This endogeneity makes solving the above problem non-trivial. As a benchmark, initially consider the case of a purely self-regarding worker; = 0. In such a case, we have EU = W and the above problem (III) corresponds to the standard Nash bargaining scenario. In this case, surplus becomes S(e; w; ) =Ŝ, as given in equation (8), and the optimal contract assigns both parties a share of this surplus that corresponds to their bargaining power, respectively. More speci…cally, the worker obtains Ŝ ; while the …rm earns (1 )Ŝ. 10 As we will show in the following, the surplus with an inequity averse agent depends on the worker's concern for inequity, , and generally falls belowŜ. Moreover, the parties' optimal shares of surplus depend not only on but also on and are in general di¤erent from those with a purely sel…sh worker. The following proposition presents the solution to problem (III), and thus, characterizes the optimal contract with Nash bargaining and an inequity averse worker.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the …rm and the worker engage in Nash bargaining and the worker's bargaining power is given by 2 (0; 1). Then under the optimal contract (e ; w ;
): (i) e¤ ort is …rst-best, i.e., e =ê; (ii) income inequity is equal across states; D H = D L =: D , (iii) the optimal wage spread is =^ = (H L) =2, (iv) overall surplus is given by S := S(e ; w ;
(v) the expected utility of the worker and expected …rm pro…t are given by:
F := F (e ; w ;
The implemented e¤ort level is …rst-best also with Nash bargaining. In line with the pro…t-maximizing contract, the optimal contract with bargaining is state-dependent and equalizes the di¤erence in net payo¤s across states. Comparing the surplus with bargaining, S , to the one under the pro…t-maximizing contract, S , as given in equation (12), shows that expressions coincide if D = D . In the foregoing section, we have veri…ed that income inequity, D , is always positive, i.e., the …rm earns more, and surplus always falls below …rst-best. In the following, we investigate the optimal level of income inequity under bargaining, D , depending on the distribution of bargaining power between the parties. Closer inspection of equations (16), (17) and (18) (iv) Accordingly, the following holds for the worker's expected utility and …rm pro…t:
Proof. The optimal contract with Nash bargaining implements wage spread ; e disregarding the value of the bargaining power. Therefore, the shares of both parties for di¤erent values of , or respectively the di¤erences in the net income, are adjusted through the wage w : Moreover, by de…nition D is strictly decreasing in the …xed wage, while w is strictly increasing in ; for 6 = 1=2 (consider Proposition 6 (i )). For every , the optimal income inequity D = 0, if and only if the optimal …xed wage w = L+c(e ) 2 satis…es the equation (44), and thus, it follows:
or equivalently,Ŝ 2 = Ŝ : The later yields = 1=2: To conclude, for = 0; D > 0 as shown in Section 4, D = 0, for = 1=2 and D is strictly decreasing in (for 6 = 1=2): By equation (17) the worker still receives -share of the accumulated surplus, but multiplied by a factor
, depending on the weight, the worker puts on achieving equitable outcome, . One can easily verify that this factor is greater than 1, if and only if (1 )G 0 (D ) > 0, or equivalently, G 0 (D ) > 0, i.e., the pro…t of the …rm exceeds the one of the worker, and the factor is less than one otherwise. Thus, for 2 (0; 1=2) an inequity-averse worker obtains a lager share than -share of the accumulated surplus, and for 2 (1=2; 1) actually a smaller one. In addition, if = 1=2; as shown above, D = 0 and equation (17) implies that both parties share equally half of the …rst-best surplus. The pro…t of the …rm follows similar logic. If the bargaining power of labor is less than a half, the …rm will obtain less than (1 )-share of the surplus and for a bigger ; vice versa.
Parts (i )-(iii ) of the above corollary show that there will always be some income inequity in the optimal contract unless both parties have the same bargaining power. In the course of bargaining, the net production, Q c (e), is distributed among the parties in each state. Recall that D = (Q W ) (W c (e)). Hence, similar to the case with purely sel…sh agents, the parties earn the same net income, (Q c (e)) =2, if = 1=2 while the …rm earns a larger (smaller) share of Q c (e) than the worker if < 1=2 ( > 1=2). It is worth noting the di¤erence to the optimal contract with a take-or-leave-it o¤er in the foregoing section. With bargaining, it is not always the …rm who earns more but also the worker may earn more or the same.
Part (iv ) of the corollary summarizes important observations regarding the relative utility levels of the parties under the optimal contract. These results allow for a comparison with the standard case with purely sel…sh workers where the …rm and the worker obtain (1 )Ŝ and Ŝ , respectively. The results in (iv ) imply that, with an inequity averse worker, the party with the smaller bargaining power obtains a larger share of the surplus compared to the case with a purely sel…sh worker, respectively. Obviously, the opposite is true for the party with the higher bargaining power. That is, inequity aversion leads to a more egalitarian distribution of surplus. The reason is that the associated optimal shares lead to an increase in the overall surplus. To grasp the intuition, suppose that one party -say party 1 -has a smaller bargaining power than the other party -say party 2. Now consider the impact of an increase in the two party's bargaining power on both parties'shares and overall surplus, respectively: Since party 1's bargaining power is below 1=2 initially, by Corollary 2 (i ),(ii ), party 1 earns less than party 2. An increase in party 1's bargaining weight then not only increases party 1's share but at the same time reduces the level of income inequity and thus raises overall surplus. Obviously, the latter has a favorable e¤ect on both parties' income. Consequently, the optimal share of party 1 rises compared to the case without equity concerns. By contrast, party 2's bargaining power is above 1=2 so that a further increase in the bargaining weight raises income inequity and thus reduces overall surplus. As a result, the optimal share of party 2 is lower than in the case without equity concerns.
The foregoing results directly lead to the following conclusion regarding the e¢ ciency of the optimal contract with Nash bargaining.
Corollary 3 With an inequity averse worker and contractible e¤ ort, the optimal wage contract with Nash-bargaining (e ; w ;
): (i) does not implement the …rst-best solution if bargaining power is not equally distributed among the parties; 6 = 1=2. Then welfare falls below the …rst-best level; S <Ŝ.
(ii) implements the …rst-best solution if both parties possess the same bargaining power; = 1=2. The optimal contract then stipulates an equal sharing rule and welfare is at the …rst-best level; S =Ŝ.
Proof. By Corollary 2 (i )-(iii ), the optimal contract implements D 6 = 0 whenever 6 = 1=2. The claims then directly follow from equations (8) and (16) Notably, while the pro…t-maximizing contract in which the …rm has the whole bargaining power, never leads to the …rst-best welfare, e¢ ciency is reestablished with Nash bargaining if the …rm's bargaining power is su¢ ciently reduced so that both parties are equally powerful. Whenever one party possesses a higher bargaining power, it obtains a larger part of the surplus. It is worth noting the following two observations. First, the worker always earns a rent, that is, his expected utility is positive, if > 0. Second, high bargaining power above 1=2 is not necessarily in the worker's interest. The surplus is maximized for a bargaining power of 1=2 since there is no income inequity, and the worker receives half of it. Increasing above 1=2 not only reduces the overall surplus (Corollary 3 (i )), but also yields the worker an expected utility is less than S , ceteris paribus (Corollary 2 (iv )). Even though is increased, and thus, he obtains a relatively larger share of the surplus, it is still possible that the worker's utility is reduced for an increased value of a:
By Proposition (5), the optimal level of e¤ort, e , and the wage spread, , are una¤ected by the worker's concern for income equity, , and the worker's bargaining power, . Yet expected utility, …rm pro…t, and surplus vary in both parameters. The reason is that the worker's optimal …xed wage, and hence his overall payment in both states, reacts to changes in inequity aversion as well as bargaining power. The following proposition states the associated comparative statics.
Proposition 6 The worker's optimal …xed wage with Nash bargaining w (i) is increasing in the worker's bargaining power; , (ii) is increasing in the worker's concern for inequity, , if 2 (0; 1=2), (iii) may be increasing or decreasing in the worker's concern for inequity, , if 2 (1=2; 1).
Proof. Applying the Implicit-Function Theorem on equation (44) with respect to and , and rearranging we obtain:
As shown in the proof of Proposition 5 in the Appendix, for a solution to exist, it must hold that G 0 (D) > 1=2. Since F 0; G 00 (D) > 0, the denominator in both derivatives is strictly positive. Moreover, the …rst terms in both numerators are non-negative, since the accumulated surplus with inequity-averse agents,Ŝ G(D), must be positive and the inequity premium is non-negative, G(D) 0. The second term in both numerators may be negative if D < 0, respectively. First, consider the numerator of equation (20) and assume that it is negative. Since G 0 (D) > 1=2, it follows that
Hence, there is a contradiction, since the pro…t of the …rm cannot exceed the accumulated by the relationship surplus, and consequently, the derivative of w with respect to is strictly positive. Second, consider the numerator of equation (21). If 2 (0; 1=2); we have G 0 (D) > 0, and the numerator as well as the overall derivative of w with respect to is positive. If 2 (1=2; 1) ; it follows that G 0 (D) < 0, and the numerator is positive i¤ (1
is given by equation (18) . Simplifying the expression veri…es that the sign of the numerator and hence the overall derivative in (21) depends on the relative levels of ; G (D), andŜ.
The intuition of the …rst claim of the proposition is straightforward. The more powerful the worker is in the process of bargaining, the higher is also his wage in both states for given . Since the wage spread is optimally set so that the loss due to inequity aversion is minimized across states, the …xed wage rises accordingly.
With respect to claims (ii ) and (iii ), note that an increase in the …xed wage entails a higher inequity premium if D > 0, hence if < 1=2. The opposite is true if > 1=2 and D < 0. In the …rst case, an increase in the …xed wage lowers the worker's disutility due to envy while, in the second case, the disutility due to empathy is raised. Accordingly, the optimal …xed wage rises in the former case in the worker's inequity aversion as this not only raises the worker's share but also yields a higher overall surplus. By contrast, if the worker is more powerful than the …rm, a higher …xed wage has two counteracting e¤ects. First, it raises the worker's share but, second, it reduces the overall surplus due to an increased level of income inequity at the same time. The optimal …xed wage balances these two e¤ects for given ; andŜ. If the …rst e¤ect outweighs the second, the optimal …xed wage is increasing in and vice versa.
Conclusion
In the current paper, we introduce social preferences in a bargaining setting. More speci…cally, we consider the productive relationship between a …rm and an inequity averse worker. The latter compares his own net income under the contract with …rm pro…t and dislikes inequitable surplus distributions in any productive state. We show that the welfare-maximizing contract stipulates an equal sharing rule in each productive state. If the worker possesses no bargaining power, the pro…t-maximizing contract never implements the …rst-best solution while converging the bargaining power of the parties may reestablish the e¢ cient contract.
Altogether, our …ndings show that an increase in the worker's concern for equity leads to a more equitable income distribution in the bargaining process and thus, a more even overall distribution of the productive surplus from the employment relationship. Moreover, our results imply that it may be socially e¢ cient to design institutions on the labor market in a way to achieve a well-balanced distribution of bargaining power among …rm owners and productive workers.
…rst-order conditions with respect to e; w; ; respectively, are:
Equation (24) implies that, for a positive level of e¤ort, if high output is realized optimal is that both parties split equally, i.e., G(D H ) = 0; or equivalently, D H = 0: It follows that the second therm in (23) (22), we observe that the optimal e¤ort is such that the marginal productivity equals the marginal costs H L = c 0 (e): Obviously, at the optimum the pro…t of the …rm and the utility of the worker are strictly positive, and furthermore, since both parties split equally, there are no additional cost due to envy or empathy and the surplus of the relationship is as given in (8). 
Proof of Proposition 2 (i )-(iii )
Thus, the …rst-order conditions with respect to e; w; and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
A positive suggests that the participation constraint (PC) is binding. Rearranging (27) we obtain:
Similarly to the above, we see that e G 0 (D H ) + (1 e) G 0 (D L ) > 1=2 implies that G 0 (D L ) > 1=2: 11 Combining (31) and (32) we obtain
or equivalently,
Thus, the payo¤s of both parties in each of the state are equal, and consequently = H L 2 : We denote D := D H = D L , the di¤erence between the payo¤s at the optimum, substitute and in (26), and after canceling common terms, we obtain:
Since G 0 (D ) > 1=2, it follows that H L = c 0 (e).
Proof of Proposition 5. The Nash Product from (III) can be rewritten as follows:
N (e; w; ) = [w + e c(e) e G(
Denoting C := EU= F , the …rst-order conditions with respect to e; w; become: 
Rearranging (39) and assuming that e > 0, we obtain:
Note, however, that the above equation is satis…ed only for G(D H ) > 1=2. By using (38), we can rewrite C as:
Equating this to (40) and cancelling common terms, we obtain
If we further use this result in (37) and rearrange terms, we obtain:
(1 + G 0 (D ))(H L c 0 (e)) = 0
1 1 For a solution to exist, it must be hold that (1 e) G 0 (DL) > 1=2 e G 0 (DH ): However,.as discussed above, G 0 (DH ) > 1=2, and thus, (1 e) G 0 (DL) > 1=2(1 e); or equivalently, G 0 (DL) > 1=2:
Since G(D ) > 1=2, it must be the case that H L = c 0 (e), i.e., e =ê:Considering (40), or equivalently, EU = 1 (1 + 2 G 0 (D )) F , we substitute the expected utility of the worker (4) and the pro…t of the …rm (2) at the optimum, and solve it for w: w(1 + 2 G 0 (D(w))) = (1 )(c(e ) + G(D(w))) + (1 + 2 G 0 (D(w)))(L + e (H L)) e (1 + 2 G 0 (D(w)))
Since 2 (0; 1), G(D ) > 1=2 implies that 1 + 2 G 0 (D ) > 0, and thus, we can de…ne w as the solution of the following equation:
(1 )(c(e ) + G(D(w))) + (1 + 2 G 0 (D(w)))(L + e (H L)) e (44) Solving for and substituting it in (2), we obtain:
(1 )(c(e ) + G(D )) + (1 + 2 G 0 (D ))(L + e (H L)) (45) or equivalently,
Considering equation (40), we can conclude that the expected utility of the worker and …rm pro…t can be presented as given in equations (17) and (18).
